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Introduction 
Increasingly, people are depending on 401(k) and 
similar defined contribution plans sponsored by their 
employers for their retirement income.  As a result, 
participants in these plans also are paying more of 
their plans’ costs, ranging from administration and 
sales expenses to the cost of managing investments.  
These costs can take a substantial toll on retirement 
savings.  Over a 30-year career, for example, paying an 
annual fee of 50 basis points can reduce the purchas-
ing power of savings at the time of retirement by 
one-eighth.
Employers who sponsor 401(k) plans have a fidu-
ciary responsibility to ensure their plans’ fees are rea-
sonable and communicated to participants.1  Recently, 
the Government Accountability Office reported that 
participants need more information and sponsors 
need to disclose this information more effectively to 
fulfill this responsibility.2  The Department of Labor is 
revising regulations to require sponsors to report the 
fees of their plans more clearly to their employees.3  
Congress also has been holding hearings, inquiring 
if greater disclosure would help reduce costs within 
401(k) plans.4
This brief reviews the structure of 401(k) plans, 
describing the services they provide and the cost of 
these services.  It also reviews the typical schedules 
of fees that providers of financial services charge 
plan sponsors and participants.  It finds that 401(k) 
fees are so complex, confusing, or obscure that many 
sponsors and participants report that they do not un-
derstand either their magnitude or their consequenc-
es.  The structure of fees does not correspond closely 
to that of costs.  Fees for some services often are set 
high enough to subsidize the provision of other ser-
vices within the plan.  In some circumstances, when 
the funds of a 401(k) plan are pooled with the funds 
of other investors, the plan’s participants might be 
paying a share of the trading costs incurred by inves-
tors who do not belong to the plan. 
This brief concludes that clearer, more complete 
disclosures of the fees charged by 401(k) plans would 
help sponsors and participants make more economi-
cal choices.  These disclosures would be most effec-
tive if the structure of fees were remodeled to match 
more clearly the specific costs of providing the various 
services within 401(k) plans.  
By Richard W. Kopcke, Francis Vitagliano, and Dan Muldoon*when buying or selling securities, and the expense of 
accepting prices away from prevailing averages when 
buying or selling large volumes of securities.  The 
costs arising from bid-ask spreading and trading large 
volumes, which are not easily measured, are implicit 
costs that are deducted from the values of securities 
as trades occur.  These trading costs are about as 
large as management costs for the actively managed 
mutual funds that commonly appear in 401(k) plans.5  
For large plans, management and trading costs can 
account for 85 to 99 percent of the plan’s total costs.6
401(k) Plans’ Fees
Companies that provide financial services to 401(k) 
plans cover their costs by collecting fees from their 
plans’ participants and sponsors.  Within a typical 
plan, a predominant fee is the expense ratio, which is 
explicitly paid by employees through an assessment 
on the value of their balances in the plan (see Figure 2 
on the next page).  Participants also implicitly pay fees 
in the form of trading costs, which can be as large as 
the fees resulting from expense ratios.
Expense ratios for the mutual funds and trusts in 
401(k) plans cover portfolio managers’ costs, a por-
tion of sales costs, and administrative expenses.  The 
administrative expenses include the costs of process-
ing participants’ transactions, maintaining custody of 
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Figure 1. 401(k) Plan Costs
Source: Authors’ illustration.
The Costs of 401(k) Plans
Employers who sponsor 401(k) pension plans for 
their employees engage financial service and adminis-
trative providers to maintain and operate their plans.  
These providers supply a range of services to their 
sponsors and participants, generating expenses that 
fall into three general categories: marketing, adminis-
trative, and asset management costs (see Figure 1). 
Marketing costs include the expense of inform-
ing participants about the plan and its investment 
options.  This expense arises from the provision of 
promotional material to sponsors and participants 
and from the efforts of service providers’ sales forces.  
Administrative costs include the expense of keeping 
records, providing statements, processing transac-
tions, ensuring the plan complies with applicable 
regulations, answering participants’ questions, and 
providing customer service.  Administrative costs also 
cover the expenses of processing participants’ special 
needs, such as making loans or processing divorce 
orders.  
Asset management costs cover the expense of 
managing and maintaining plans’ assets.  These costs 
typically include payments to portfolio managers, the 
expense of investment research, the payments to cus-
todians who hold the plans’ assets, and trading costs.  
Trading costs comprise commissions on securities 
transactions, the expense of paying bid-ask spreads 
401(k) costs
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the funds’ assets, and tracking the assets’ values.  The 
12b-1 fees, which are charged as a percentage of as-
sets, pay for the marketing and selling of the funds as 
well as communications with participants.
The expense ratios of mutual funds offered in a 
401(k) plan often range from 10 basis points to more 
than 150 basis points with 50-100 basis points being 
the most common range for actively managed funds.7  
Many plans also offer their participants the opportu-
nity to invest in private investment pools, often or-
ganized as trusts, instead of mutual funds.  The fees 
of these trusts can be significantly lower than those 
of similar mutual funds, with expense ratios ranging 
from 2 to 50 basis points.
The “other” fees of plans include trading costs, 
which cover brokerage commissions and the unfavor-
able prices that result from trading larger blocks of se-
curities.  These fees, which are not explicitly charged 
to participants, are charged directly against the value 
of assets as trades occur.
In some instances, participants also might pay 
a fee assessed on the amount of their contributions 
into their plans or their withdrawals from their plans.  
These assessments are known as “loads.”  At the end 
of 2006, only about 25 percent of 401(k) plans’ assets 
were held in mutual funds with some type of load.  
However, these loads often are waived for participants 
in retirement plans.8
A small fraction of the total fees in 401(k) plans 
are constant dollar assessments levied on each ac-
count or each participant.  These fees, which do not 
vary with the size of the account, usually cover the 
cost of keeping records and issuing statements to 
participants.  
Although participants pay the majority of the fees 
in most 401(k) plans, most employers pay at least 
a small fraction of their plans’ maintenance costs.  
Most often the employers pay the fees of vendors 
who provide recordkeeping and related services for 
their plans.  But even when the employers take the 
responsibility of paying for these services, the fees 
paid by employers frequently do not cover the full 
cost of these services.  In common “revenue sharing” 
arrangements, the fees assessed against participants’ 
accounts are shared with the vendors providing 
recordkeeping and related services.  These shared fees 
range, in general, from 10 basis points of assets up to 
35 basis points.  These sharing arrangements, which 
are proprietary and kept out of the public domain, 
reduce the net fees that employers need to pay.
 
Disclosing Fees
Currently, most 401(k) plans do not report their fees 
in a convenient manner.  Fees typically are not men-
tioned in participants’ monthly account statements 
or in quarterly reports.  Plans typically do not encour-
age participants to review fees when they reallocate 
their balances or their contributions.  Expense ratios 
Figure 2. 401(k) Participant Fees
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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effectsoften are provided only in handbooks or technical 
supplements that are available upon special request 
or after searching beyond each plan’s primary website.   
Participants who obtain these fees must then multiply 
the expense ratios for each of their investments by the 
average balances they have held in each investment in 
order to calculate their total fees in dollars.
The Department of Labor is developing two sets 
of regulations, to be adopted in 2009, for improving 
the disclosure of fees.  The first will provide more 
guidance for sponsors in choosing the best vendors 
for their 401(k) plans.  This set of regulations will 
establish standards of disclosure to assist sponsors in 
assessing whether contracts with vendors are reason-
able and suitable for their plans.  The second will 
establish new standards for disclosing fees to partici-
pants.  These regulations will encourage vendors and 
sponsors to provide more information about fees, 
expressed in a clear and useful format.
With these reforms, participants in a 401(k) plan 
could receive, once a 
year, a report of the fees 
they paid, expressed in 
dollars as well as expense 
ratios.  They also might 
receive a more conve-
nient disclosure of fees as they make their investment 
decisions.  Although reforms like this can improve 
disclosure considerably, they would not reveal the 
implicit fees that result from trading costs.  Trading 
costs depend on the frequency, volume, and timing of 
trades conducted by mutual funds’ portfolio manag-
ers.  These costs are significantly higher for actively 
managed funds than for more passively managed 
index funds.  These costs also are higher for funds 
that attract investors who actively trade their mutual 
funds’ shares.  Accordingly, potential reforms might 
ensure that sponsors and participants understand the 
additional costs they incur from holding actively man-
aged mutual funds and mutual funds whose assets 
under management are more volatile than average.  
Lacking full information, sponsors and participants 
might select costly actively managed funds that might 
not be the most reasonable or suitable investments 
within their 401(k) plans.  
Design Issues
Even with better disclosure, the current structure of 
fees would still raise at least three issues for 401(k) 
plans.  First, as discussed above, most 401(k) plans 
simply charge participants a fee that is expressed as 
a percent of their assets.  Although this expense ratio 
often varies by type of asset, reflecting differences 
in the cost of managing the funds, it is otherwise 
constant.  This bundled fee is itself very simple, but it 
does not allow a plan’s participants to weigh the ben-
efits against the costs of their plan’s services as they 
manage their assets.
Second, the familiar constant expense ratio also 
transfers retirement wealth from accounts with 
higher balances to those with lower balances.  Other 
things equal, the fees collected from participants 
tend to be a constant proportion of the balances they 
hold in the plan.  Yet, some of the costs covered by 
these fees – many administrative and sales costs – are 
relatively constant for all participants, regardless of 
the size of their balances.  Moreover, participants with 
twice the balances of others are not likely to entail 
twice the management cost, although they pay twice 
the management fee.  Thus, a constant expense ratio 
is a deceptively simple 
method of pricing, 
which, by decou-
pling fees from costs, 
reduces the return 
credited to higher bal-
ance accounts while boosting that on lower balance 
accounts.  This transfer of wealth tends to be larger 
within plans with greater ranges of account balances 
and within plans that achieve greater economies of 
scale by controlling their costs more effectively.
Consider the following example.  Suppose the 
various costs for a plan amount to 0.8 percent of its 
assets.  These costs include marketing and admin-
istrative costs of $100 per year for each participant.  
These costs also include investment management 
expenses, which range from $200 a year for a par-
ticipant with a balance of $20,000 to $400 a year for 
a participant with a balance of $80,000.  Suppose, 
further, the plan charges its participants a fee equal to 
0.8 percent of balances to cover all of its costs.  The 
participant with a balance of $80,000 would pay a 
fee of $640, but this participant would account for 
only $500 of the plan’s costs.  The participant with 
a balance of $20,000 would pay a fee of $160 while 
accounting for $300 of the plan’s costs.  This discrep-
ancy between the fees each participant pays and the 
cost of services that each uses can increase as plans 
achieve greater economies of scale in managing their 
assets, so that management costs vary relatively little 
by size of account.
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Beyond disclosure, 401(k) fees 
raise design issues.Issue in Brief 5
This subsidization of accounts with lower balan-
ces, in principle, can be desirable from the viewpoint 
of public policy.  But, obscuring the specific costs that 
are bundled within the simple expense ratio serves 
neither public policy nor participants in 401(k) plans.  
The amount of the subsidy can vary significantly for 
participants with low balances, depending on the 
amount or type of assets held by others in their plans.  
Simple expense ratios, therefore, obscure policy-
makers’ ability to assess and compare the subsidies 
received by participants across different 401(k) plans.  
This lack of information hinders policymakers from 
assessing the equity, adequacy, or propriety of sub-
sidies.  Are participants with relatively large 401(k) 
balances otherwise sufficiently wealthy to subsidize 
other participants?  Does the bundling of expenses 
hinder sponsors and participants from making more 
economical choices, which consequently reduces 
retirement wealth for all participants?  Might the 
importance of saving for retirement warrant funding 
the subsidies in another way?  Might inequities in the 
treatment of participants in 401(k) plans discourage 
participants with higher balances from accumulating 
or holding assets within their plans?  Within the in-
tent of The Employment Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, should fees be reasonable for each and 
every participant?
Third, the investment of 401(k) funds in pools of 
assets that include other investors also can decouple 
fees and costs in a way that needlessly reduces the 
rate of return on these 401(k) funds.  All investors in 
a pool share proportionately the trading costs incurred 
in managing the pools’ assets.  Most of these costs are 
not reported or measured, implicit only in transaction 
prices as the pool buys or sells assets, and therefore 
charged directly against the value of the pools’ assets 
as trades occur.  If all investors traded their shares in 
the pool equally frequently and in amounts of nearly 
the same proportion to their balances, then this shar-
ing of the pool’s own trading costs would be equitable.   
But, when some of the pool’s investors trade more 
aggressively than others, the aggressive investors pay 
trading costs only in proportion to their average bal-
ances, not in proportion to their larger trading activity.   
Accordingly, when 401(k) plans offer their partici-
pants the opportunity to invest their money in funds 
or trusts that also include other investors who trade 
more actively, the plans’ participants sacrifice returns 
on their retirement saving by subsidizing the trading 
costs of these other investors.
To illustrate this cost, consider the case of a 401(k) 
plan that offers its participants a popular index fund.9  
Suppose this fund also attracts other investors who 
trade more aggressively.  The investment by the plan 
accounts for 1/10 of the total investment in the index 
fund, and the plan’s participants, on average, conduct 
one transaction a month, buying or selling 0.1 percent 
of their balances.  The outside investors conduct 
transactions twice a month, buying or selling 0.2 
percent of their balances.  In these circumstances, the 
plan’s participants account for only 2.7 percent of the 
fund’s trading costs, but pay for 10 percent of these 
costs, a fee that is 3.7 times the cost of their services.10  
If annual trading costs amount to 6.4 basis points per 
dollar of balances, the return on the 401(k) partici-
pants’ balances would be reduced by 6.4 basis points 
rather than the 1.7 basis points that represent their 
share of trading costs.11  This toll can be much greater 
for investments in actively managed mutual funds, 
for which estimates of trading costs are as much as 
7 times that of index funds.12  This toll also is greater 
for investments in funds that pay larger brokerage 
commissions to cover the cost of other services they 
obtain from their brokers, a practice commonly called 
“soft-dollar” arrangements.13
Conclusion
A clear and complete disclosure of fees and costs will 
help employers fulfill their fiduciary responsibility 
to ensure that the defined contribution plans they 
sponsor do not impose unreasonable costs for their 
employees.  This disclosure, in turn, also can help 
employees avoid expenses that unnecessarily dimin-
ish the value of their retirement savings.  But better 
disclosure alone is not sufficient.  The structure of 
fees commonly used in 401(k) plans tends to transfer 
wealth among participants and can reduce the returns 
that participants earn on their wealth.
These findings imply that employers would ben-
efit from more guidance, in law and regulation, in 
satisfying their fiduciary responsibilities for selecting 
both service providers and investments as well as 
making sure their plans’ fees are reasonable given the 
quality of their services.  This guidance could encour-
age service providers to disclose the structure of their 
fees in more detail and to charge fees that correspond 
to the cost of services their participants use.  It also 
could encourage plans to provide investments that do 
not expose participants to excessive trading costs and 
to the risk of subsidizing other investors who do not 
belong to the plans.  These investments can include 
separate accounts, exchange-traded funds, trusts, 
collective investment funds, and mutual funds that 
restrict transactions.Center for Retirement Research 6
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1  U.S. Department of Labor (1998).
2  U.S. Government Accountability Office (2006 and 
2007). 
3  For proposed regulations for ERISA Sections 
404(a) and 408(b)(2), see U.S. Department of Labor 
(2007 and 2008).
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Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec (2007).
6  HR Investment Consultants (2007).
7  Investment Company Institute (2007).
8  Investment Company Institute (2007).
9  The plan’s participants can be offered a class of 
shares in the index fund that charges them appropri-
ately lower sales, administrative, and management 
fees than the classes of shares offered to other retail 
investors.  This example emphasizes the implicit 
“fees” for trading costs, which are not covered by 
these other fees.
10  Suppose the total assets of the fund are $100 mil-
lion, with the plan’s participants holding $10 million.  
The monthly trading volume for the participants 
would be .001 x 1 x $10 million, or $10,000.  The 
volume for other investors would be .002 x 2 x $90 
million, or $360,000.  The participants’ share of total 
trading costs is 10 / (360+10), or 2.7 percent.  Trading 
costs reduce the net values of the fund’s assets, so all 
investors pay a share of these costs that is propor-
tional to their share of the fund’s assets.  Participants, 
therefore, are charged 10 percent of the trading costs, 
10 / 2.7 = 3.7.
11  For 6.4 basis points, see Karceski, Livingston, and 
O’Neal (2004). 
12  On larger trading costs, see Karceski, Livingston, 
and O’Neal (2004), and Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec 
(2007). 
13  On soft dollars, see Lemke and Lins (2008).Issue in Brief 7
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